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1. Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s, advanced economies in western Europe and North America have been 
experiencing a transition from a nationally-configured, Fordist-Keynesian developmental 
approach towards a ‘flexible’ mode of production based in and around city-regions. This 
scalar shift took place through the reconfiguration of regulatory relations between national, 
subnational and supranational governments, a process broadly conceptualized as state 
rescaling (Peck, 2002, 2003; Brenner, 2004; Jessop and Sum, 2006). A similar 
reconfiguration was occurring in previously-insulated China following the re-implementation 
of market-like rule in 1978: special economic zones (SEZs) became designated in strategic 
cities to engage the global system of capitalism, while production within the vast rural 
hinterland was downsized from massive communes to the individual household. Over the 
last decade, a series of intra-urban territories termed officially as “nationally strategic new 
areas” (guojia zhanlüe xinqu) have been designated to experiment with policies that ease 
the pressures confronting national regulation. Unsurprisingly, the state rescaling framework 
has attracted the attention of researchers seeking to evaluate and explain the emergence of 
city-regionalism across China (see, e.g. Li and Wu, 2012; Li et al, 2014; Wu, 2017). 
This paper presents and critically reflects on the research design for a multi-sited 
study of these “new areas”. Beginning from 2011, the study primarily aimed to ascertain why 
these territories were designated and how they affected national-level regulation. Fieldwork 
was undertaken in three different areas at different moments between 2012 and 2013, 
namely Beijing (to access major universities, archives, decision-makers); Chongqing (to 
understand the emergence of Liangjiang New Area) and the city-region of the Pearl River 
Delta (hereafter PRD, to understand the emergence of Hengqin and Qianhai New Areas, the 
key nationally strategic areas in the region before the official designation of Nansha New 
Area as “nationally strategic”). Follow-up fieldwork was conducted in the PRD in 2015 and a 
new round of data collection is underway in Chongqing at the time of writing. 
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The research design was based on an analytical framework that foregrounds the 
relationship between state rescaling, policy experimentation and path-dependency (see Lim, 
2017a).  This framework plugs a gap in the existing literature by focusing on the tensions 
between place-specific experimentation with national-level change (an outcome of state 
rescaling) and the constraining effects of path-dependency at both local and national levels 
(a determinant of future rescaling). This focus on institutional continuity and change across 
different regulatory scales distinguishes the state rescaling focus in this study from other 
regional and urban issues across China: while changing regulatory relations could directly 
impact urban regeneration, transportation planning, and industrial policies, these issues 
were not directly integrated into the research design. Rather, the study complements existing 
urban and regional studies of China by highlighting how policy changes within city-regions 
co-exist with and at times contradict institutional continuity at the national scale.   
Specifically, data collection was organized along five interrelated dimensions, 
namely, to identify 1) the primary scale of socioeconomic regulation of the time (i.e. was it 
the national, subnational or supranational?); 2) the rescaling tendencies (i.e. are more 
institutionally-distinct territories emerging?); 3) the institutions and/or actors that drive and 
coordinate the primary scale of socioeconomic regulation (i.e. was it the central government, 
local governments, SOEs or TNCs?); 4) the degree to which experimental reforms (e.g. 
financial sector reforms in Qianhai New Area) change or keep intact inherited institutions 
established as far back as the formative years of Chinese statehood (e.g. the insulated and 
self-reinforcing national financial system); and, last but not least, 5) the rationale of state 
rescaling. These dimensions collectively addressed the following two research objectives: 
 To foreground the process of designating specific locations into “nationally strategic” 
reform frontiers, with emphases on the agendas of different interest groups and the 
politics of the designation process.  
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 To evaluate the effects of these experimental policies across different scales (urban, 
cross-provincial and national) and over time (extending back into the Mao era). 
The merits and challenges of the research design will be presented in the following three 
parts of this paper. Section 2 provides an overview of the research context, paying attention 
to the constitutive roles of the extended case method and the ‘concurrent nested strategy’. 
Section 3 then evaluates how the chosen methods enabled the fulfillment of the research 
objectives. The implications of this research design for future research on Chinese state 
rescaling is considered in the conclusion. 
 
 
2. The research context 
 
The project on Chinese state rescaling and policy experimentation follows Heilmann’s (2008: 
2) approach to understand the extent to which “existing, and initially deficient, institutions 
can be put to work, transformed, or replaced for economic and social development in an 
open-ended process of institutional innovation that is based on locally generated solutions 
rather than on imported policy recipes.” For Heilmann (2008; also Heilmann and Perry, 
2011), the reason why the Chinese state effected large-scale politico-economic change 
without experiencing systemic collapse was due to its ability to implement “adaptive 
governance”. This refers to the Chinese central government’s ability and willingness to 
respond strategically to initiatives proposed by local governments. Building on this approach, 
the project aims to show how the central government developed this specific capacity to 
govern through state rescaling, and makes explicit how “nationally strategic” experimentation 
are not only solutions to local problems – the intention of geographically-differentiated 
experimentation is to simultaneously improve central regulatory capacities. In so doing, the 
project problematizes the traditional ‘tiao tiao’ (vertical lines of authority leading to/from the 
central government) and ‘kuai kuai’ (horizontal lines of authority extending at/from the 
provincial or local levels) modes of governance by demonstrating the entwinement and co-
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dependence of tiao-kuai relations. 
To achieve these objectives, the study deployed the ‘extended case study’ method 
developed by Burawoy (2009). Broadly, this method privileges the refinement of theories 
through their application to different cases, and is largely similar to O’Brien’s (2006) flexible 
approach to research (re)design while conducting research in China. For O’Brien (2006: 31) 
and his collaborators, arriving in the field with a preconceived theoretical framework was a 
useful first step, but the process then gave way to “reveling” in the “particular and concrete”, 
such that theory, concepts and evidence became aligned at the end of the project. Burawoy 
(2009: 68) terms this prioritization of theoretical refinement reflexive science:  
Here we have a craft mode of knowledge production in which the product governs the 
process. The goal of research is not directed at establishing a “definitive” truth about an 
external world but at the continual improvement of existing theory. Theory and research are 
inextricable.   
 
Where this project differed from O’Brien’s (2006) approach was its multi-sited focus. It is in 
this regard that the inherently comparative aspect of Burawoy’s approach stands out. Rather 
than assess the cases in isolation or against one another based on a pre-determined 
template, the comparative aspect of the extended case method is to trace  
the source of small differences to external forces. This might be called the integrative or 
vertical approach. Here the purpose of the comparison is to causally connect the cases. 
Instead of reducing cases to instances of a general law, we make each case work through its 
connection to other cases.(Burawoy, 2009: 49-50) 
 
Pertaining to the two chosen study sites of policy experimentation, the aim was to ascertain 
how each case could be considered “nationally strategic” when its experimental policies 
differed vastly from the other. For this reason, no preconceived parameters for comparisons 
between each ‘new area’ were derived. Neither were the developments in each area 
benchmarked against a stylized model (e.g. that of a ‘variety of capitalism’). The goal, rather, 
was to explain how and why subnational actors lobbied the central government for the power 
to tentatively reform national-level institutions.  
This comparative approach offered greater flexibility to tease out the connections 
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between state rescaling, policy experimentation and institutional path-dependency. It stands 
distinctly apart from prevailing narratives in the Chinese media and academic circles that 
compare one ‘nationally strategic new area’ to another based on some ‘objective’ 
parameters (e.g. income, geographical extent, population etc.; see, for instance, Xue and 
Wang, 2011; Vanke Weekly, 2 July 2013). The latter approach appeared to be missing a 
crucial point: each new area contains experimental reforms that are set within its immediate 
geographical-historical context but simultaneously addresses specific national-level 
structural constraints. And it is through assessing these reforms in tandem that 
contradictions pertaining to national-scale restructuring became apparent.  
For instance, while the designation of Liangjiang New Area overlapped preexisting 
reforms of the 1958 hukou institution that offered rural migrant workers equal access to social 
benefits as urban residents in Chongqing, the national designation of Hengqin and Qianhai 
New Areas took place against a backdrop of a “double relocation” restructuring agenda 
aimed at removing targeted industries and labor power. The hukou institution lubricated the 
relocation of migrant workers in key manufacturing cities in Guangdong, with some cities 
cutting down the population by at least half through sending migrant workers ‘back where 
they belong’ (Interview, Shenzhen, January 2013). To sharpen the contradiction, it was the 
same political actor – Wang Yang – who kickstarted both the “nationally strategic” reforms 
in Chongqing and Guangdong. When “integrated” in this way, to re-borrow Burawoy’s term, 
the emergence of each new area simultaneously expressed the contrasting effects of some 
inherited institutions on national-scale economic restructuring. Tracing the source of 
differences between each new area to the foundational institutions of the CPC thus offered 
an incisive insight into the tensions underpinning China’s transition to a ‘socialist market 
economy’.  
There was an inherent difficulty to this comparative approach to empirical collection, 
however. While the broader focus is to understand how the Chinese state reconfigures 
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space to attain its politico-economic objectives, there were moments when it was hard to 
conceptually buttonhole general observations of reforms in each ‘new area’ without a stylized 
model or fixed set of variables. Perhaps this is an inevitable aspect of following 
experimentation in ‘real time’: theorizing the ‘how’ and ‘why’ instead of the ‘what’ as things 
change quickly is fundamentally an open-ended process in which links between raw data 
must be built up in small parts. The task was further complicated by the fact that the inherited 
institutional landscape in China is a combination of spatially-selective experimentation (cf. 
Rawski, 1995, Naughton, 1995, Ong, 2004). This means there were multiple overlapping 
developmental paths to be identified, not one based solely on an internally coherent ‘national 
agenda’.   
With an analytical scope that encompasses this expansive space-time horizon, it was 
determined from the outset that there would be no best method of data collection. What 
appeared initially to be a broad research area was subsequently narrowed as the project’s 
objectives took shape. A framework was subsequently developed that focused principally on 
how geography constitutes politico-economic evolution, followed by the notion that 
geographically-targeted experimental strategies generate new logics of socioeconomic 
regulation in part because of problems associated with earlier regulatory logics (see Lim, 
2017a). The research target thus became more and more visible: what were these 
experimental strategies, what kinds of problems did they trigger, and did the successive 
series of spatial strategies adequately resolve these problems? Once these empirical 
questions emerged, new conceptually-significant questions followed: why, despite these 
problems, did some inherited policies from previous regimes continue to impact the present? 
Vis-à-vis the path-dependent effects of these policies, (how) could it be argued that political-
economic development in China is currently in a new epoch? 
The emergence and crystallization of these research questions soon illustrated the 
importance and benefit of constructing a primary database on policy formation (ref. objective 
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1, introduction section). “Understanding why policy both ends up as it does and fails to 
achieve its goals”, writes Glasmeier (2007: 219), “requires understanding of the political 
context in which policy is both constructed and implemented.” For this reason, it would not 
suffice to just describe policy shifts; how these shifts were justified and contested by Chinese 
policymakers positioned at different levels of the political hierarchy was the main area in 
which the internal logics of institutional change could be understood and evaluated. The goal 
of data collection was thereby to collate a series of arguments and (counter-)justifications 
that could explain why certain policies succeeded and how they generated challenges that 
required new rounds of geographically-targeted experimentation. 
Specifically, the database was constructed to describe and explain 1) the 
socioeconomic relations that constituted and are affected by the production of “nationally 
strategic new areas”; and 2) the impacts of interactions between the experimental policies 
and the inherited institutions in the two chosen research sites (i.e. Chongqing and the Pearl 
River Delta). These two case studies helped to sidestep an important ‘methodological trap’, 
i.e. the notion that a totalizing reconstruction of the past is possible. Through the 
identification of theoretically-significant empirical phenomena in the case studies (e.g. which 
institutions are resistant to change today, which policies the state strives to reform, etc.), 
new questions were generated. These questions, such as why the hukou institution remains 
so resistant to change in spite of the reforms in Chongqing, opened up new avenues to re-
interpret events that have had specific and seemingly-taken-for-granted meanings attached 
to them.  
For instance, the literature on China’s ‘Third Front’ construction program (sanxian 
jianshe) in the mid-1960s over-emphasized its geopolitical motivations, but the materials 
collected for this project strongly suggests it was also an attempt at crisis-diversion that 
reflected Mao’s obdurate stance against more ‘market-friendly’ reforms proposed by key 
cadres such as Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping and Deng Zihui. Through this push, Mao retained 
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two crises-generating policies – the large-scale collectivization of rural production through 
the People’s Communes and the mandatory geographical segregation and quasi-permanent 
confinement of the population – running almost on auto-pilot until his death in 1976. And the 
economic-geographical outcome was entrenched uneven development: not only did inter-
provincial income and output inequality did not narrow, urban-rural inequality worsened after 
the campaign to locate industrial resources to inland provinces designated as the ‘Third 
Front’ (see discussion in Lim, 2017b) 
The questions then became even more specific: since these two policies were 
emblematic of governance logics of the Mao administration, why did Deng Xiaoping and his 
successors choose to retain key aspects of their institutional characteristics up to the 
present? What does this retention say about path-dependency in post-Mao regimes’ 
approach to economic development? More to the point, what does it say about the 
contemporary relevance of Mao-styled regulation? With new interpretations came new 
meanings, and new meanings in turn generated new questions. In a way, then, the 
juxtaposition of different and at times contrasting interpretations in this project was as much 
about generating new questions about the China ‘growth miracle’ as it was about producing 
new explanations. And as the next section will discuss, addressing these new questions 
entailed a flexible and multi-dimensional set of methods. 
 
3. The methods: critical reflections 
 
Detailed collection of empirical materials was conducted prior to, during and after the 
embarkation of three field visits to China, namely between January and February 2012 (to 
Beijing, with a stopover in Shanghai); in March and April 2012 (to Chongqing); and in January 
2013 (to Hengqin, Qianhai and Macau, with a stopover in Hong Kong). As Table 1 shows, 
three methods were adopted in this project, namely policy and secondary literature analysis, 
interviews with key actors involved in or with the experience in planning and consulting for 
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the government, and statistical collation. These approaches are not novel, to be sure, when 
assessed individually vis-à-vis those adopted in other studies on Chinese state rescaling. 
For instance, Li and Wu’s (2012) extensive analysis of Chinese state rescaling drew on 
historical analysis, policy analysis and mapping of Mao-era spatial projects. In a subsequent 
project, they conducted 50 in-depth interviews to determine the politics of regional 
cooperation in the Yangtze River Delta (Li and Wu, 2017). Sun and Chan (2016: 5-6), on the 
other hand, primarily analyzed planning discourses in their study of state rescaling in the 
Pearl River Delta. While these approaches overlapped the set of three methods, the latter 
was distinct in the way it was organized based on what Creswell (2003: 218) terms the 
“concurrent nested strategy”.  
This strategy focuses attention on the collection of both quantitative and qualitative 
data, but one approach would be primary and the other (hence the ‘nesting’). After a 
preliminary round of data evaluation, it became apparent that the qualitative data would be 
prioritized, while quantitative materials would complement rather than form the core 
analytical basis. To follow McDowell (2010: 158), the aim of qualitative research is to “probe 
an issue in depth: the purpose is to explore and understand actions within specific settings, 
to examine human relationships and discover as much as possible about why people feel or 
act in the ways they do.” The primary reason for this preference was due to the study’s 
emphasis on ‘why’. To ascertain and explain the tendencies and rationale of active spatial 
configuration in the contemporary juncture and ascertain the extent of path dependency, it 
was necessary to identify data that could assist in forming a coherent narrative of change. 
In this regard, speeches and/or interviews given by key causal actors and policy documents 
could more incisively reveal why specific actors like Wang Yang and Bo Xilai drove state 
rescaling than analyses of statistical significance or software-based modeling (see, for 
instance, Lim, 2016; cf. Lim and Horesh, 2017; Gao et al, 2017).  
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Table 1. Contributions and constraints of chosen methods through the concurrent 
nested strategy 
 
Methods Contributions Constraints 
 
Qualitative source I: 
Policy & secondary 
literature analysis 
(especially Chinese-
language sources)  
 
 Establish clearer directions for 
interviews, statistical collation 
and geo-historical analyses 
 Policy documents offer concrete 
bases for conceptualization & 
evaluation 
 Chinese-language articles, 
books, news reports offer 
access to otherwise 
inaccessible views of key 
political actors  
 
 
 Policy documents may contain 
jargon & be vague about specific 
details 
 Lack of control over questions to 
key actors 
 Some Chinese-language sources 
are not easily available outside 
China 
Qualitative source II: 
Interviews with key 
actors involved in or with 
experience in 
planning/consulting for 
the government  
 
 Offers first -hand information 
that may not have been 
published previously 
 Provides suggestions on further 
secondary sources to consult  
 
 Difficult to access actors with 
direct involvement in state 
rescaling, especially cases that 
were more contentious 
 Tendency to refer to publicly 
available information 
 
Supporting 
quantitative sources: 
Statistical collation, 
compilation & cross-
referencing 
 Reveals major trends such as 
urban-rural income ratio, fixed 
capital investments, 
employment rates, etc. 
 Once completed, trends lead to 
further cross-referencing with 
published reports, which led at 
times to additional information 
 Many trends may not be revealed 
by published statistics & require 
further sourcing of secondary & 
primary data, e.g. degree of 
central government SOE 
investments in the “nationally 
strategic new areas” 
 Officially published statistics may 
not be fully accurate, which 
underscores the importance of 
cross-referencing & research 
through other methods 
  
 
Source: Author’s formulation.  
 
Two vignettes on the analysis of quantitative data from the Pearl River Delta explain 
why a qualitative approach was preferred to address the five dimensions of state rescaling 
delineated in section 1. First, while state published statistics would reveal increased fixed 
capital investments in Hengqin New Area, they do not reveal the financiers of the investment. 
By extension, it would not be possible to explain, based on these statistics, why specific 
financiers and not others funded the investments. The interviews with the 
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academics/consultants in Shenzhen led to information on the financiers (predominantly 
state-owned enterprises and national banks controlled by the central government). Further 
checks were then conducted, and this shaped the conclusion reached at the end of the case 
analysis: state rescaling benefits provincial governments in the short term because they 
augment GDP figures, yet this GDP embellishment is only possible through central 
governmental support (via the centrally-controlled SOEs and financial institutions). At the 
macro level, this offers a new explanation why so many provincial governments are lobbying 
the central government to reconfigure their administrative territories into “nationally strategic 
new areas”.  
Second, the official employment figures in Guangdong province were found to be 
positive even after the global financial crisis struck in 2008. Nationally, the published 
unemployment rate was under 10%. Yet the-then Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, 
acknowledged in 2010 that 200 million people were unemployed, which translated to a 
14.5% unemployment rate relative to the total population and 20% relative to the working 
population. Relative to official accounts from Guangdong, Wen's speech opened up new 
questions on 1) the veracity of the national unemployment rate; 2) why employment 
continued to grow in Guangdong while the rest of the country was experiencing a staggering 
unemployment rate exceeding 20%; and 3) why other provinces fared so much worse than 
Guangdong in unemployment rates given that the majority of migrant workers were (and 
remain) based in Guangdong (or, more specifically, the PRD where the majority of industrial 
activities take place). These new questions facilitated the formation of a tentative conclusion: 
as the most attractive destination for migrant workers across the country, Guangdong 
successfully 'relocated' unwanted migrant workers after the 2008 crisis. As such, 
unemployment that should be concentrated in situ was 'exported' to the other provinces, 
which in turn created new opportunities for ‘scaling up’ territories in the PRD in the name of 
the “national strategy”. This 'exportation' strongly suggests why 200 million people (a 
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substantial number who would have been working in Guangdong) were unemployed across 
China while the official employment rates remained positive in Guangdong during the same 
period. Without Wen's speech, it would have been impossible to arrive at this conclusion 
(which, to be sure, invites future scholars to make more substantive verifications). 
Given that the three field visits involved interactions with as many as 80 individuals 
on various occasions (e.g. lunches and dinner hosted by local governments, chats with 
guides at visitor centres of the New Areas), it was difficult to define the total number of 
‘interviews’. Strictly speaking, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 31 academics 
and policymakers during the three field visits, while interactions with other individuals that 
yielded insights into developmental processes in the new areas were written into field notes. 
Where possible, attempts were made on-site to follow up on suggestions given by 
interviewees or from informal interactions (e.g. sourcing for statistics, old maps and policy 
documents). Back in [home city], renewed efforts were made to contact the individuals for 
subsequent information and suggestions. In this respect, ‘fieldwork’ continued beyond the 
‘field’.  
The active engagement with interviewees within and beyond the field corresponds 
with Barnes’ (2001: 557) observation that theorizing is “a social activity like any other”. The 
opportunity to be hosted at the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in Beijing offered a 
tremendous platform from which enrolment into domestic academic networks became 
possible. This enrolment in turn offered many stimulating ideas, which was then followed by 
an extensive on-site search for secondary materials. The Beijing visit was followed up with 
CAS-arranged visits to many locations that reflect the ongoing reforms in Chongqing, such 
as the new tax-free logistics zone, factories in Liangjiang New Area, public housing 
construction sites, the land transfers office, etc. Accessing this network offered invaluable 
opportunities for establishing contacts. 
The data collection process in Zhuhai and Shenzhen (where the new areas of 
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Hengqin and Qianhai are located, respectively) involved more spontaneity: an encounter 
with a local construction employee led to a motorcycle tour of the island and a lunch meeting 
with many of his friends in the construction industry. This tour opened access to the 
exhibition hall, where conversations with three employees were established, and the main 
village on Hengqin. Inside the village, more historical accounts of the development of the 
area became clearer. The community centre representative offered a broad overview of 
developmental changes, and how further development could affect the area. Over in Macau, 
separated from Hengqin by a narrow waterway, two interviews were conducted with legal 
consultants and another with an academic specializing in public policy. While in Shenzhen, 
the opportunity to interview four academics proved especially helpful, but in an indirect 
manner: they offered recommendations to relevant documents and what they knew about 
the context of the policy changes rather than put on record their personal insights on the 
policymaking process. 
However, one reason why fieldwork never ends in the field site is due to the lack of 
adequate information from the informants. At one level, this reflected a practical constraint: 
visa restrictions and a small financial budget limited the length of time in the field site (and 
hence the number of potential interviewees). At another level, this was attributable to a 
general tendency of interviewees – state officials in particular – to avoid answering questions 
directly or offer in-depth personal views. The general refrain from actors representing the 
state would be ‘all information on our work can be seen online, you can visit our webpage to 
find out more’. This refrain was discouraging at times, as government websites normally lists 
policy documents without discussing in detail why these were launched. How could the 
study’s objective of establishing rationale be attained if it was not possible to hear from the 
‘horse’s mouth’? Glasmeier’s (2007: 218-219) account on policy analysis offered a 
particularly helpful reminder: 
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Confirming intent is done using open-ended interviews with key informants who were policy 
analysts, agency personnel and politicians themselves. Newspaper articles can corroborate 
findings from the administrative record. The bottom line is that historical understanding 
requires archival research coupled with personal interviews with individuals engaged in the 
policy debates of specific times…Such analysis highlights the intended, and by implication 
allows for the interpretation of unintended, consequences of public policy.  
 
Establishing “intent” is a multi-dimensional process, as Glasmeier’s experience indicates. 
On reflection, this is not only true in the context of this study on Chinese state rescaling; it 
underscores the need to be flexible in dealing with different dimensions as conditions 
develop ‘on the ground’. The closure of one potential source of information – information 
from actors that represent the state – only made it imperative to open other doors. Vis-à-vis 
the tight-lipped state-linked actors, it became clear that scholars or business consultants 
were keen to talk and offer assistance. For one respondent, “discussing these issues with 
you is interesting because my days in the office are often very boring” (Interview, Shenzhen, 
January 2013). Because of their experience in and/or knowledge of the circuits of policy 
deliberation, insights from these respondents proved very helpful in identifying causal 
relations (see discussion on the field experience in Hengqin and Qianhai above). Often, 
these insights offered new opportunities to deepen the contextualization of published state 
discourses; question the feasibility of some experimental policies, and identify patterns and 
logics pertaining to state rescaling in China. 
To enable this re-contextualization, the collection of published materials became a 
very important moment of the research process. Major policy documents (e.g. the 12th 5-
Year Plan; Plan for Guangdong-Macau-Hong Kong; Great Western Development plan; etc.) 
and published interviews by state actors were collected, translated and analyzed. Many of 
these documents, mostly published in Chinese and which have not been discussed by 
scholars outside China, offered rich background knowledge of the historical contexts of the 
‘new areas’ and the reasons why these areas were given national designations. Policy 
analysis was complemented by an analysis of statistical and qualitative information 
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published in the media. Close to 800 articles published in various media in China, Hong 
Kong, Macau and Taiwan were collated. These articles provided a significant source of 
information, including statistical information on updated capital flows into the ‘new areas’ as 
well as major firms that have moved into the areas. A substantial amount of this information 
was not reported in the statistical publications of the Chinese government, but nonetheless 
helped to highlight both the causes and effects of place-specific policy experimentation.  
The personal conversations were especially beneficial when it came to the analysis 
of historically sensitive policies (particularly those pertaining to life in the People’s 
Communes, the logics of the Great Leap Forward, etc.): the intention was to gain 
perspectives from within China that complement research already conducted on these 
historical events, and many interviewees offered tremendous help in pointing out local 
articles, books and archival sources. As mentioned earlier, the opportunity to conduct 
multiple field visits also made it easier to collect materials on site: it was often during the 
intermittent periods of fieldwork, when the collected data was collated, that ‘missing’ 
information was identified. The possibility of a subsequent visit thus offered fresh 
opportunities to plug the ‘data gap’. To be sure, there are no clear boundaries – if there are 
boundaries at all – to this research field. This means there are always new data to explore 
and analyze; the challenge is to determine how much information would suffice to render a 
cogent narrative. In itself this was a major lesson of the research process.  
A key source of published information was interpretations of policies given by senior 
policymakers (e.g. leaders of major state-owned enterprises, city mayors, and senior 
academics who have participated in policymaking as consultants). Given the practical 
challenges involved in directly accessing these senior figures, their views from published 
sources were taken to be those of the state. These sources were especially worth analyzing 
given the CPC’s extreme caution with the public use of words. In fact, Mao Zedong was 
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acutely aware of the significance of language that he advised Wang Hongwen, a close aide 
and, in a private 1974 conversation to choose his words carefully: 
From now on, you must pay a lot of attention when you speak, do not express a stance easily. 
The most important ingredient of political leadership is not to let others know what you intend 
to do or say in your next move. If others can predict all your actions, where would there be 
the art of political leadership? Regarding words that we have yet to utter, we are their masters; 
regarding those words already uttered, we are their slaves. (Documented by Shi, 1998, 
Chapter 30; author’s translation)1. 
 
By Mao’s logic, which should be well-known to senior CPC cadres, words “already uttered” 
represent a “stance”, and it was this stance regarding regulatory reconfigurations that the 
research aimed to identify and compare with actual outcomes (ref. second research 
objective delineated in section 1).  The reason is straightforward: these words not only offer 
insights into reasons for rescaling, they also function as concrete benchmarks against which 
“unintended consequences”, to re-borrow Glasmeier’s (2007) terms, could be assessed. 
Senior political actors had given numerous interviews on state rescaling and policy 
experimentations to local magazines and newspapers, and some have even published 
articles in Chinese-language academic journals. These sources constituted the primary base 
from which to examine the intentions of their respective projects. Given that they were major 
‘causal agents’ (i.e. actors with the power to effect change and/or implement policies) 
involved in the development of policies, it was assumed their views comprise a discourse 
against which alternative interpretations could be juxtaposed.  
However, a surprising outcome of this juxtaposition was the identification of different 
viewpoints amongst what is often perceived to be a homogeneous group of state-linked 
actors. These differences are important findings in themselves for two reasons. First, they 
foreground the difficulties of effecting institutional change in a broader structure still officially 
devoted to the doctrines of Marxism-Leninism. Once placed in specific institutional positions, 
actors have to defend their own interests in order to be recognized for promotion rise in the 
administrative hierarchy (cf. Chien and Gordon, 2008; Chien, 2010; Xu, 2011). How these 
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interests complement or contradict interests of other political actors thus become in itself an 
important point of empirical focus. Second, these different viewpoints indicate how top-level 
decision-making in the Chinese party-state apparatus is an open-ended process. This open-
endedness indicates the intrinsic malleability of political authoritarianism: actors positioned 
in different parts of the institutional hierarchy, or even external to the hierarchy itself, could 
shape developmental agendas. In this respect, state rescaling reflects and reproduces this 
malleability; its occurrence was never pre-ordained, its outcome never predetermined. 
 It would be useful, at this point, to explain why statistical data did not underpin the 
primary analytical focus. To be sure, there were moments where quantitative data was 
important and was presented to support arguments. These data was used to demonstrate 
the ‘price scissors effect’; to describe changes in migration flows in the post-Mao era, urban-
rural income disparities, etc.; to show changes in fixed capital investment in Guangdong and 
Chongqing; and to show trends of monetary flows between Hong Kong/Macau and mainland 
China. Yet this information was used and evaluated ‘as is’ rather than re-presented through 
a new round of software-based analysis. This is because the study’s research objective of 
delineating the assumptions and rationale of spatial projects and strategies could be better 
achieved by examining changes in policy content and how new changes were interpreted 
by decision-makers. Textual data is thus just as important as quantitative data in informing 
the analysis of China’s politico-economic ‘transition’ in the post-Mao era.  
Furthermore, the available quantitative data would have to be evaluated in their own 
right rather than be taken as inherently accurate: in as much as they reveal, quantitative data 
obscure. This point was made explicitly by Li Keqiang in 2007, the-then governor of Liaoning 
province and now Chinese Premier, in a conversation with then US Ambassador to China, 
Clark Randt Jr.: 
GDP figures are ‘man-made’ and therefore unreliable, Li said.  When evaluating Liaoning’s 
economy, he focuses on three figures:  1) electricity consumption, which was up 10 percent 
in Liaoning last year; 2) volume of rail cargo, which is fairly accurate because fees are charged 
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for each unit of weight; and 3) amount of loans disbursed, which also tends to be accurate 
given the interest fees charged.  By looking at these three figures, Li said he can measure 
with relative accuracy the speed of economic growth.  All other figures, especially GDP 
statistics, are ‘for reference only,’ he said smiling. (Randt, Jr., 15 March 2007, n.p.)  
 
In an interesting development, the Chinese government did not issue any denial of Randt’s 
statement. More importantly, Li’s point is subsequently supported by claims made 
elsewhere. In May 2012, Junheng Li, the founder of New York-based venture capital firm JL 
Warren, went public with a personal reflection on the use of quantitative data in China: 
I learned the most important lesson about doing business in China: Numbers don’t mean 
much. Most companies have three books: a real one for internal use, one for the tax bureau 
and one for the CEO’s wife (and, in some cases, a fourth for his mistress). China’s hybrid 
economy depends more heavily on government policy than most, and can count on the 
cushion of intervention from on high. Once a growth target is set by the top, the central 
government then allocates GDP growth from the top down. The state gives provinces a target, 
each province mandates to the regions, regions to departments, and departments to 
corporations, including state-owned enterprises and private companies. Despite the 
admirable economic growth that China has delivered, at its core the reward and punishment 
system hasn’t changed in stride. Those who comply are rewarded and those who raise 
uncomfortable subjects are punished; a cut in pay or a cork in one’s career advancement are 
to be expected if one can’t provide the euphoria package. (Bloomberg, 23 May 2012) 
 
This inherent numerical inaccuracy, Li adds, is fundamental to structural stability:  
 
There is a Chinese saying usually applied to the legal system: While the top has its policies, 
the bottom has its counterpolicies [i.e. shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice]. In economics, if the 
bottom can’t meet the mandate, they cook the books and send the data back up the ranks. 
Everyone’s happy – for a while. It’s as if Mao’s proposed farming methods could actually 
produce the amount of crops that were being reported – if the powers that be must be pleased, 
so be it. As long as the upper levels of governance maintain their authority and lower levels 
of governance don’t take any heat for a missed target, then everyone can be happy. (Ibid.) 
 
These observations further reinforce the necessity for qualitative data to complement (if not 
contradict) quantitative analyses. If fudging numbers can ensure structural stability, the 
study presumes something else must have been done to ensure the tensions associated 
with growth are eased or erased. Given that speech is not intrinsically more believable than 
numbers, the study adopted the approach mentioned earlier to build on and verify 
information given by interviewees. Content derived from published interviews was also 
cross-checked (where possible) or used with clear qualifications. Overall, the juxtaposition 
of discourses from key state actors and the detailed textual analysis of policy changes since 
1949 has offered a useful avenue through which to theorize the shifting spatial logics of 
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socioeconomic regulation in China.  
 
4. Conclusion 
Throughout this study on Chinese state rescaling, the biggest methodological challenge was 
to assemble a range of seemingly unrelated empirical materials into a coherent and 
theoretically-informed narrative. This paper has demonstrated how the logics of state 
rescaling could be ascertained from a fluid approach to fieldwork, the prioritization of 
qualitative data and a critical approach to data evaluation. On reflection, one key aspect of 
the research design was that research questions change over time (cf. O’Brien, 2006). For 
this reason, it was difficult to define ‘stages’ on the data collection process. This ties in to the 
broader notion that ‘fieldwork’ is in itself a dynamic process that is not simply defined by and 
delimited to ‘flying in, flying out’. As Crang and Cook (2007) put it eloquently, data gathered 
on a subject matter always undergoes interpretation, even when the researcher is still ‘in’ 
the field. ‘Doing’ fieldwork is thus a reflexive, spiral-like process of gathering and responding 
to data, which then generates new questions. How the ‘field’ has been re-imagined and re-
constructed during this process is the central focus of this paper.  
Having arrived at a clearer understanding of the state rescaling process through 
fieldwork, it would be useful and important to state what the chosen research approach is 
not. First, the goal of the historical analysis is not to attempt the (impossible) task of 
cataloguing and explaining the totality of relations extending from the Mao-era to the post-
Mao present. Historical exploration can enrapture and entrap at the same time: there is just 
so much to explore, so many materials in the archives or libraries in China that are of 
potential theoretical significance. The challenge is to derive the right conceptual lenses to 
launch into a targeted historical exploration, otherwise the massive pool of historical 
information could easily encumber the research process. How, indeed, does one start and 
stop looking?  
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This answer to this question crystallized once the research design was established. 
The past can be most fruitfully interpreted and re-interrogated from the experimental policies 
of the present. And because what constitutes the ‘present’ always changes as time 
progresses, the scope for further re-interrogation and conceptual revision remains. This 
generates at once a contribution and a constraint – a constraint emerges insofar as the 
analytical framework adopted for this project will inevitably be subject to revision as more 
empirical cases (e.g. further studies of other “nationally strategic new areas” such as Binhai, 
Lanzhou and Zhoushan) are brought into the mix, and yet it is a contribution because specific 
developments in the present (e.g. the drives to reform the hukou institution and the financial 
structure) has allowed the past to be interpreted in a different light (ref. research agenda 
presented in Lim, 2017a).  
Second, the paper does not claim to define the full rationale of state rescaling from 
the two chosen case studies. As discussed earlier, an important caveat in research on state 
spatial strategies reside in the fact that access to primary policymakers (i.e. causal actors) 
is largely off-limit. For this reason, it is difficult to understand directly what went on inside the 
CPC boardrooms where recent decisions were made. As elaborated in Table 1, the closest 
one could attain a deeper understanding of the rationale of state rescaling would be through 
a) policy discourse analysis; b) analysis of interviews given by the primary policymakers; 
and c) interviews of people who encountered these policy actors. Because of the intimate 
connections between academic institutions and state organs (academics routinely consult 
for the CPC), many potential interviewees were in academic institutions. From personal 
experience, access to these interviewees was not only more straightforward, these 
interviewees were generally keen to engage and offered excellent follow-on leads (either 
through recommendations to other interviewees or referrals to print materials in local 
libraries). Yet the inability of this research to access all key actors mean the rationale 
presented in this project is always partial. 
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The issue of access notwithstanding, the geographical extent of “nationally strategic” 
policy experimentation also encumbered the development of more generalizable 
conclusions. At the time of research, six "nationally strategic new areas" had been 
designated, each of which have experienced transformations in relations with the preexisting 
spatial hierarchy in China as well as with transnational economic actors. At the time of 
writing, this figure has expanded to seventeen. As the selected cases were just two out of 
several alternatives, they are more fruitfully viewed as specific launchpads for evaluating the 
impact of inherited institutions. Vis-à-vis these variegated 'empirical windows', the ultimate 
decision to focus on state rescaling in/through the Pearl River Delta and Chongqing boiled 
down to whether these cases could provide nuanced insights into the geographical and 
historical rationale of policy experimentation.  The process involved collating and re-
constructing a narrative that connects the post-Mao experimental present to the policies 
instituted in the Maoist past, while bearing in mind it is never possible to cover every track 
and trace of political-economic transition in China. Then again, it is this very openness to 
refinement through additional case studies that further research on Chinese state rescaling 
will continue to engage and excite.  
 
 
 
Notes 
1 From the author’s review of published Mao sources in Mandarin, this note was not selected as part 
of the CPC’s voluminous collections of Mao’s speeches. Drawing from Shi’s (1998) research into 
former Premier Zhou Enlai’s interactions with Mao, it could be the first time this perspective on 
language is translated into English.  
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